AuthLN
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Authority you can prove

Prove who got in.
Prove what acted.

AuthLN proves who was allowed in, what was allowed to act and on whose authority, on a record no one can rewrite.

Book an Agent Access ReviewSee how it works
Lineage: authority traced from a personAuthority starts on the left, from one person, and branches out to three agents, then to sub-agents and their sub-agents, and each branch is narrower than the one before. An action from the last sub-agent passes a gate and is added as a new block to a record held to the right, outside the system that acted.

The core problem

When AI agents hand work to other agents, no one can say who authorized each action or show that it stayed within its limits.

The spread: one approval, everything it starts, one credential on every callOne person approves one agent. That agent fans out into a grid of sub-agents, every one of them in coral, carrying the same reach as the parent. All of them converge on your systems through one credential, so there is no way to tell which hand acted.
One personapproves once
One agentthe only thing approved
Sub-agentsinherit the same authority as the parent agent
Your systemsone credential on every call, no way to tell which hand acted

Who authorized this action?

Logs show a credential, not the person who granted it or the task they meant.

Did it stay within its limits?

Nothing narrows as work passes down, and the only record is the agent's own log.

Two layers One record

One governs the front door. One governs what happens inside.

  1. A personsigning in
  2. Factor Assurancethe front door: who is allowed inShipped
  3. Your organization
    1. Agentsacting for one person
    2. Sub-agentsstarted along the way
    3. Agent Authorityin every path: what may act, and on whose authorityComing soon
    4. AppsDataAPIs
The recordevery sign-in decision, grant, action and refusal, write-once and out of reach
Authority to enterShipped

Factor Assurance

Who is allowed in. It stands in front of your identity provider, and every sign-in decision is recorded. Every attempt resolves to Authorized, Denied or Walked away.

Factor Assurance
Authority to actComing soon

Agent Authority

What software may do once it is in, including AI agents acting for a person. Every action checks a person's grant at a gate in front of the resource.

Agent Authority

The record Proof of both

Every attempt, grant, action and refusal, on a record no one can rewrite.

A sign-in attempt leaves a record whether it was authorized, denied or walked away. Agent Authority is designed so that every grant, action and refusal down a chain of agents lands the same way.

The record is written once and held where the thing being recorded cannot edit it. Transparency is the product, not a feature: you check the record instead of taking anyone's word.

How the record works

The system that acted

Apps, agents and your identity provider act here. None of them can edit what lands on the right.

The record · write-once Illustrative entries

  1. 8f2c62Sign-inAuthorizedoutcome, correlation ID, timing
  2. 8f2c55Sign-inWalked awaythe missing device signal is the finding
  3. g-0417Grantauthority, from a named personwhat it covers, and who it was handed toComing soon
  4. a-0418Actionsub-agent 4: update ticketwithin the grant, on the recordComing soon

Patents

Two issued U.S. patents: US 11,956,366 and US 12,118,550.

SOC 2

SOC 2 Type I completed; Type II examination underway, report expected Q3 2026.

Trust Center

Policies, controls and documents for your security review. trust.authln.com

Available now

How many agents are running in your environment today, and who owns them?

Agents are being turned on across the tools you already use. They act with people's access, and most teams cannot say what each one can reach or how to stop it. In two weeks, from read-only exports and with nothing installed, an Agent Access Review answers it.

Book an Agent Access ReviewWhat the review covers
One person approves one agent. The agent starts sub-agents that fade from view, and the trail ends in a question mark: nobody can say how many there are or who owns them.?

And the questions that follow

  1. 01How many changes can one agent, and the sub-agents it starts, make in our systems?
  2. 02When we revoke a person’s access, do the agents acting for them lose it at the same moment?
  3. 03If an agent is compromised, what did it do, and under whose authority?
  4. 04When did an agent first reach sensitive data, and whose grant let it?